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ABSTRACT: There are many assumptions held by policymakers and scholars about the potential
for hydroelectricity in the Himalayas. The first assumption is that the Himalayan rivers of
Bhutan, India, and Nepal possess a vast untapped source of hydrolectricity. The second is that
the benefits of realizing this potential will provide for a routine cross border trade in relatively
clean and sustainable electricity that will support economic growth throughout the region. The
third is that despite the perceived benefits there are longstanding barriers that have prevented
large scale hydroelectric development.
Oseni and Pollitt (2016) argue that it would be worth understanding what barriers stand in the
way of expanding cross border trade in electricity in South Asia and how they can be overcome.
There have been, however, numerous attempts to identify and analyze these barriers. This
literature includes studies from the Asian Development Bank, the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation, the World Bank as well as individual scholars.
Most of these works focus on certain aspects of the issue, but tend to overlook a few important
points. This paper will docus on two and argue that, firstly, the potential for hydroelectricity in
Himalayan rivers has been exaggerated and needs to be reconsidered. Secondly, the barriers to
hydropower development are not, as often assumed, simply technical questions regarding
engineering strategies, environmental impact assessments, regulatory reforms or project
financing. Instead, the barriers are much greater. Once barrier is the hydroelectric dam itself.
The megadams required to sustain a cross border trade in electricity are highly problematic.
Another barrier is the legacy of decades of failed hydro-diplomacy especially between India and
Nepal.
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There are many assumptions held by policymakers and scholars about the
potential for hydroelectricity in the Himalayas. Hydroelectricity is seen by national
governments, engineering and energy firms, and International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
like the Asian Development Bank and World Bank to have enormous benefits with
relatively few drawbacks. Hydroprojects are seen to have great potential for economic
growth while at the same time producing less pollution than commonly used fuels like
coal, reducing reliance on non-renewable fossil fuels, and increasing energy security by
reducing dependence on imports from politically volatile places like the Middle East.
(Dhungel 2008; Nakayama and Maekawa 2013; Rasul 2014; Siddiqi 2007).
In 2005, the members of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) agreed to create a regional ‘energy ring’ that would develop an electricity grid
that would connect each of them and allow for the routine cross-border importing and
exporting of electricity with an emphasis on hydroelectricity.1 The basic premise behind
the agreement is that electricity is essential for economic growth and the reduction of
poverty, but across the region the demand for electricity greatly exceeds the supply.
Access to electricity is low compared to other parts of the world with 40 per cent of the
population in Bangladesh having at least some access with 89 per cent in Bhutan, 53 per
cent in India, and 33 per cent in Nepal (GNHC 2013; PC 2014; Singh 2013) so that for
SAARC there needs to be further electrification in the region.2 The ‘energy ring’ would
be located mostly in the Himalayas in the eastern section, ‘quadrilateral’ section
(Srivastava and Misra 2007: 3363), or ‘growth quadrangle’ (Wickramasinghe 2001, 246)
of SAARC that would connect the national grids of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal
and facilitate the greater utilization of hydroelectricity.
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Hydropower is the only source of electricity that could support a sustainable
cross-border trade in electricity within South Asia. In a general sense, advocates of
cross-border trade in electricity see it as a way to promote greater overall economic
integration within South Asia while fostering sustainable economic growth. The Asian
Development Bank, for example, has incorporated this perspective in its lending policies
(Ford 2009). Obaidullah (2010b, 7) states that ‘regional electricity trade is one of the
most lucrative items of the trading basket of South Asia.’
In a more tangible sense, cross-border trade in electricity is necessary in
expanding hydroelectricty due to the technical aspects of power generation and
distribution. Energy resources are scattered throughout the region and, especially with
hydel, the generation of electricity occurs great distances away from the centres of
demand. Electricity itself cannot effectively be stored so it must be transmitted across
national borders from, say, dams in Bhutan to consumers in Delhi. The only way to store
(potential) electricity would be to construct large storage dams that hold back water for
future use (Sengupta 2001).
The cross-border trade in electricity in the Himalayas, however, has made little
progress thus far. Despite efforts to add hydel projects over the past decade, Nepal is still
a net importer of electricity from India and the government in 2011 declared an energy
emergency as the country was forced to turn to oil imported from India to augment
flagging hydroelectricity production (Rai 2011). Bhutan is often seen as being more
successful than Nepal in expanding its hydel capacity, but this relative success is due to a
single project, the Tala dam. The Tala dam with an installed capacity of 1020 MW was
completed in 2006. Since then there has been little growth in installed capacity in Bhutan
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with capacity rising to 1498.83 MW in 2013 from 1497.36 MW in 2007/08 (NSB 2014).
As such, Bhutan contributes only about 0.5 per cent of India’s electricity supply (CEA
2015a).3 In 2013, a new high voltage direct current transmission line was built adding a
substantial link between the electricity grids of Bangladesh and India. However, the
electricity involved is generated in coal fuelled power plants rather than hydroelectric
dams (ADB 2013 and Kamrul 2013).

Hydroelectric Assumptions
The first assumption regarding the possibility expanding hydroelectricity in the
Himalayas is that the Himalayan rivers of Bhutan, India, and Nepal are a vast untapped
source of hydrolectricity. Calculations vary, but India has developed about 26 per cent of
its hydel potential while Bhutan has used only about 5 per cent of its potential and Nepal
roughly 1.5 per cent (Obaidullah 2010a; Katel, Schmidt-Vogt and Dendup 2015; MoP
2016). Proponents of hydroelectricity see massive volumes of power simply waiting to
be exploited which will support continued economic growth for years to come.

The second assumption is that the benefits of realizing this potential will provide
for a routine cross border trade in relatively clean and sustainable electricity that will
support economic growth throughout the region. Throughout the region, there has been a
renewed interest in developing hydroelectricity after years of relative decline as a power
source. In South Asia as a whole, the share of electricity generated from coal has risen
from 56.9 per cent in 1990 to 66.2 per cent in 2000 while that from hydro has declined
from 27.6 per cent to 15.3 per cent over the same period (Thakur and Daushik 2004). In
India, the share of electricity from hydel has dropped from 49 per cent in 1951 to 13 per
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cent in 2015 while the share of coal is at roughly 61 per cent (CEA 2015a; CEA 2015b;
Sengupta 2001). Moreover, reliance on biomass sources like firewood is still quite high
in parts of South Asia Biomass constitutes 87 per cent of energy consumption in Nepal,
66 per cent in Bangladesh, and 33 per cent in India (Singh 2013) with the result that both
indoor and outdoor air pollution in much of the region is worsening. The indoor air
pollution generated by biomass and coal has contributed to respiratory illness among
rural populations, especially women (Malla 2008). The continued use of biomass as well
as coal has placed ‘great stress on the atmosphere’ (Sengupta 2001, 184) in, among other
things, the forms of carbon dioxide and black carbon which contribute to global warming
and glacier melt in the Himalayas (Malone 2010 and Qiu 2010).
In contrast to fossil fuels and biomass, hydel is seen by advocates as renewable
and less stressful on the environment (Malla 2008; Rasul 2014; Siddiqi 2007). The
World Bank has gone so far as to declare that ‘the Himalayan hydropower sites are, from
a social and environmental perspective, among the most benign in the world’
(Dharmadhikary 2008, 21). In particular, small hydel facilities, often referred to as run of
river projects, are seen as impacting the environment less than the alternatives because
while they channel a river’s waterflow, they do not create large storage reservoirs that
submerge farmland and forests (Ramanathan and Abeygunawardena 2007). By
submerging farmland and forests, these large reservoirs can emit substantial amounts of
greenhouse gasses with the result that large hydel projects are not necessarily an
environmentally friendly alternative to fossil fuels (Yang et al 2014).

The third assumption about the hydel development in the Himalayas is that
despite the enormous perceived benefits there are longstanding barriers that have
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prevented large scale hydroelectric development. The objections to hydroelectric
development in the Himalayas have taken many forms over the years and are subject to
divergent readings. Because of the multiplicity of perspectives it is difficult to generalise
but it is clear that sweeping dismissals of criticisms of hydroprojects as merely
NIMBYism are not accurate.4 As Sengupta (2001, 184) notes, there can be ‘serious
conflicts of interests’ between the various stakeholders including electricity users, people
living near the project, and those downstream like farmers and fisherfolk who are
affected by changes in the volume of water available. Objections to hydroprojects can
take the form of technical criticisms in a given project’s design, funding mechanism, or
other details as well as a determined resistance to stop a proposed dam by the people
adversely affected by the size or location of the project.

Barrier Analysis
Oseni and Pollitt (2016) argue that it would be worth understanding what barriers
stand in the way of expanding cross border trade in electricity in South Asia and how
they can be overcome. There have been, however, numerous attempts to identify and
analyze these barriers. This literature includes studies from the Asian Development Bank
(Wijayatunga and Fernando 2013), the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (Obaidullah 2010a; Obaidullah 2010b), the World Bank (Newbery 2007;
World Bank 2008) as well as individual scholars (Siddiqi 2007; Srivastava and Misra
2007; Dhungel 2008; Malla 2008; Makayama and Maekawa 2013; Singh 2013; Rasgul
2015). There have also been numerous relevant energy sector studies focusing on
development barriers in Bhutan (Uddin, Taplin and Yu 2007; Dhakal and Jenkins 2013),
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India (Balachandra 2006; Singh 2006; Ramanathan and Abeygunawardena 2007;
Satyanand 2011; Shukla and Thampy 2011; BMI Research 2016), and Nepal (Upadhyay
and Tulakhar 1997; Johnson 2010; Sovacool, Dhakal, Gippner and Bambawale 2011).

Most of these works focus on certain aspects of the issue such as the legal
framework for cross-border trade. For example, Obaidullah (2010a, viii) argues that even
though both Bhutan and Nepal ‘have hydropower export friendly laws and policies’ the
legal infrastructure necessary for routine long-term, large-scale trade has yet to be
created. Mala (2008) argues that delay is due to policymakers in the region who are still
beholden to ideas of economic nationalism and overly value national self-sufficiency in
energy as a high priority. Singh (2013, 468) argues that the mindset of SAARC members
needs to change so that they understand the cross-border trade in electricity as a ‘policy
which has the potential to bring about necessary change in the equality, reliability and
efficiency of power supply and thereby accelerate the process of economic growth’.
As useful as these critiques may be, they tend to overlook a few important points. This
paper will focus on two and argue that, firstly, the potential for hydroelectricity in
Himalayan rivers has been exaggerated and needs to be reconsidered. Secondly, the
barriers to hydropower development are not, as often assumed, simply technical
questions regarding engineering strategies, environmental impact assessments, regulatory
reforms or project financing. Instead, the barriers are much greater. One barrier is the
hydroelectric dam itself. The megadams required to sustain a cross border trade in
electricity are highly problematic. Another barrier is the legacy of decades of failed
hydro-diplomacy especially between India and Nepal
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Many of the claims regarding the potential for hydroelectricity in Himalayan
rivers are misleading and need to be revised. Some of the estimates and projections
confuse or conflate the theoretical potential capacity with the economically feasible
potential capacity. The latter, of course, is based on several assumptions many of which
are difficult to quantify such as the social and cultural costs of projects (Dharmadhikary
2008).
The estimates of undeveloped hydroelectric potential are complicated by
problems inherent in the data used in the calculation. One difficulty is that in some cases
the weather, climate, and hyrdological data are quite limited or out of date (Raju et al
2013; Yadav 2013; Ray et al 2015; Shea et al 2015). In Bhutan, for example, data on the
volume of waterflow in the rivers has been collected for relatively short periods of time
(Baillie and Norbu 2004) and there is ‘a severe lack of field data’ on glacier masses and
ice losses throughout the Himalayas (Rupper et al 2012, 1). A second problem with the
data is that some of it is not available at all. Various governments in the region have
restricted Himalayan hydrological information as national secrets which makes outside
analysis of hydel projects awkward (Bandyopadhyay and Perveen 2003; Iyer 2003).
Another difficulty with estimates of undeveloped hydroelectric potential is that
there is no universally accept method to calculate the costs and benefits of hydel projects.
One problem is that the construction costs of hydel projects is frequently underestimated
(Ansar, Flyvbjerg, Budzier, and Lunn 2014; Awojobi and Jenkins 2015; Chophel 2015).
D’Souza (2014, 67) argues that this is a systematic issue because the ‘quantitative data on
river hydrology [is] often conceptually suspect’. Despite the methodological problems
some authors contend that benefits of most hydel projects is greater than the cost (Briscoe
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2008; Awojobi and Jenkins 2015). Ansar, Flyvbjerg, Budzier, and Lunn (2014, 44) argue
that ‘the purported benefits of large hydropower dams prove uncertain’ and that ‘even
before accounting for negative impacts on human society and environment, the actual
construction costs of large dams are too high to yield a positive return’. As for negative
social and environmental impacts, Rasul, Chettri and Sharma (2011, 2) argue that these
include ‘supporting services that maintain the conditions for life; provision services that
provide direct inputs to livelihoods and the economy; regulating services such as those
that provide flood and disease control; cultural services that provide opportunities for
recreation, and spiritual or historical sites…’
The last problem in the estimates of hydroelectric potential is the question of large
or mega storage dams versus smaller run of river projects. Storage dams are large
structures dozens or hundreds of metres tall that hold and store water in reservoirs that
sometimes cover dozens or hundreds of square kilometres while run of river projects
involve smaller structures that channel water flowing through tunnels and turbines. In
their operation, run of river projects rely on the volume of water available in the river
which will vary seasonally while storage dams hold water back for use at a later date.
For proponents, large storage dams are necessary in order to generate the amounts of
electricity needed to sustainably drive economic growth. A small run of river dam like
Kurichu in Bhutan has a height of 55 m and has the capacity to generate 60 MW
(megawatts) while a large run of river dam such as Tala in Bhutan has a height of 92 m
and the capacity to generate 1,020 MW. In contrast, the Tehri in India is a storage dam
with a height of 260 m, a generating capacity of 2,400 MW and a reservoir or submerged
area of 52km2, and the proposed Pancheshwar dam on the India-Nepal border would be
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even larger with a height of 315 m, generating capacity of 6,000 MW, and a reservoir of
134 km2 (Everard and Kataria 2010; Malla 2008; Obaidullah 2010a). Furthermore, as
Obaidullah (2010a) notes, projections of the hydel potential in Nepal assume that at least
half of all new projects would be large storage dams. It is simply not possible to generate
the amounts of electricity decision makers want with only run of river projects, especially
in the dry season when the volume of water declines sharply (Wijayatunga and Fernando
2013; World Bank 2008). Indeed, in recent years, during the dry season Bhutan goes
from being an exporter to an importer of hydroelectricity from India (Sarkar 2014;
Wijayatunga and Fernando 2013).
It should be realized, however, that the classification of dams is an inexact science
(See Abbasi and Abbasi 2011). In some cases the builders of a given dam will attempt to
minimise potential objections to the project by simply calling it a run of river project
regardless of whether it really is, but more importantly some dams incorporate elements
of both run of river and storage designs. They are often classified as run of river even
though they have a greater environmental impact due to incorporating substantial storage
reservoirs and underground water diversion tunnels as long as 15 km (Dharmadhikary
2008).
Combined, these are significant complications that require great caution when
estimating undeveloped hydroelectric potential and the viability and profitability of future
hydel projects but they are mentioned too infrequently in studies of hydroelectricity by
the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and private corporations.
The barriers to hydropower development are not, as often assumed, simply
technical questions regarding engineering strategies, environmental impact assessments,
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regulatory reforms or project financing. Instead, they are much greater. Once barrier is
the hydroelectric dam itself. The megadams required to sustain a cross border trade in
electricity are themselves highly problematic.
Hydropower projects require tremendous capital and the four quadrilateral states
have sought out private and foreign investment to drive new projects (Srivastava and
Misra 2007). With all four countries pursuing economic liberalization and seeking nongovernmental sources of investment, particular attention will be paid to private sector
organizations. With the goal of the marketization of electricity generation and supply,
private corporations are increasingly becoming an important part of the construction of
SAARC’s energy ring especially as companies in South Asia are expanding their
activities beyond their home country’s borders. (Obaidullah 2010b; Satyanand 2011).
With varying levels of commitment, the governments in South Asia began
programs of neoliberal economic reform in the 1980s and 1990s. There has been a great
deal of debate over the motivations of these governments especially in terms of whether
the reform agenda was imposed on them under duress by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank during economic crises (Sharma 2006; Stiglitz 2002).
Clearly, pressure from the IFIs was an important factor in initiating economic
liberalization and given this unpromising start it is no surprise that both the process and
results of reform has been uneven (Malla 2008; Singh 2013). Reforms in the energy
sector in particular have been limited compared with other sectors of the economy with
private companies contributing to only a small percentage of electricity generation and
distribution throughout the region. By May 2015, roughly 7 per cent of India’s installed
capacity of hydel was contributed by the private sector (CEA 2015b).
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Throughout the region, successive governments have opened parts of the energy
sector to private companies, but proponents of reform find that much has yet to change
(Newbery 2007; Singh 2013). The World Bank in particular has complained that the
public sector still dominates the energy sector with vertical operations that both generate
and distribute electricity although it does find it ‘heart-warming’ (World Bank 2008, xx)
to see that despite the slow pace of reform the governments of South Asia are finally
beginning to turn away from the old mindset of ‘inward-looking’ development based on
national self-sufficiency and import substitution towards ‘outward-looking, exportoriented reforms’ that initiate ‘a virtuous cycle in which growth and liberalization
mutually reinforce one another’ (World Bank 2008, 21). Politicians delay further reform
in order to use public utilities as tools of both state policy as well as political advantage
with the result that public companies sell electricity below market rates and provide
subsidies for preferred groups (Mala 2008; Sethi 2014; Singh 2013).
With hydel, the continued prominence of the public sector is even more
pronounced. State owned companies are actually expanding their activities with crossborder projects to such an extent that even state owned companies from outside the
region like the China Three Gorges Corporation have gotten involved. Dhungel (2013)
argues that after a promising start in the 1990s, the contribution of the private sector to
hydel in Nepal has faltered in recent years. He suggests that greater involvement of the
private sector is necessary but given the long timelines in hydel projects it is necessary
for the government needs to do more to make it happen including providing subsidies.
Shukla and Thampy argue that private sector investment in electricity production in India
has thus far involved a handful of companies and that government action is needed to
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limit further concentration of the electricity generation market. The risk of growing
concentration of the market ‘strengthens the need for setting up more generation
capacities in the joint sector amongst state generation companies, central public sector
firms and the private sector’ (Shukla and Thampy 2011, 2708).
Moreover, political instability, especially in the 1990s, and corruption have
hindered liberalization in Bangladesh, India and Nepal. Bhattacharya (2007, 327)
describes the combination of self-interest and short-term thinking that is found all too
often in the public power sector:
Being state-owned entities, the electric utilities in the region were traditionally
under political control, which benefitted the political masters both directly and
indirectly. Reform initiatives opened new opportunities for quick personal gains
for bureaucrats and politicians, and as politicians were unsure about their tenure
in power, maximisation of their personal gains required short-term outlook and
focus on quick gains. This explains licensing and approvals of unviable
projects, agreeing to unfavourable terms for power purchase from private
utilities, and offering of attractive incentives – all at the cost of the state utility
and contrary to long-term objectives of the sector.
The burden of politically motivated price subsidies and investment incentives on the
energy sector has resulted in capacity and energy shortages; and the sector as currently
structured is not sustainable (Balachandra 2006; Sethi 2014; Shukla and Thampy 2011;
Singh 2006).
There is also the difficulty of identifying the exact boundary between public and
private enterprises with Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), joint ventures, as well as the
large scale financing of projects by national government and IFIs rendering a binary
either/or definition inadequate. An example of this lack of clarity can be found in the
Khimti 1 Hydropower Scheme in Nepal. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) of
the World Bank refers to Khimti 1 as the ‘first private hydropower scheme in Nepal’
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(IFC 2011, 20) even though Himal Power Ltd (HPL), the company building it, does not
qualify as privately owned or funded in any conventional sense of the term. HPL is a
PPP that is 57 per cent owned by SN Power, itself owned by the Norwegian government,
while the private Butwal Power Company of Nepal owns a minority stake in the company
and has received extensive funding from the IFC, Asian Development Bank, the
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, the Nordic Development Fund, and
the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund).5 Clearly, the bulk
of the risk associated with this project has not been assumed by the private sector and the
project cannot be described as a private sector venture in any meaningful way.
Wickramasinghe (2001, 248) argues that PPPs rarely work as advertised as they tend to
shift the risk to government but reserve the profits for private companies. Consumers are
not better served and PPP projects weaken the ‘credibility of the reform process.’ This is
exacerbated by opportunistic behaviour from the private sector as well as regulatory
uncertainty. A notable problem with PPPs in India is the frequent practice of
renegotiating the terms of contracts after the projects have been awarded. Pratap (2014,
23) argues that ‘the increasingly shriller demand for renegotiations’ is evidence of flaws
in the PPP system and that ‘bad projects’ are not allowed to fail. As such, PPPs in India
have produced scant returns and thus far present poor value for money (Pratap 2013;
Pratap 2014).
In addition, the entry of private companies into the energy sector has not always
proven to be the panacea advocates of liberalization have expected. With the Andhikhola
Hydroelectric and Rural Electrification project in western Nepal, Bastakoti (2006, 28)
observes that private utilities like the Butwal Power Company ‘are not willing to put
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some profit aside to promote people-centred development approaches … but are solely
oriented to commercial interest.’ Some of the companies have been involved in outright
criminality such as Enron which signed a contract to build the Karnali-Chisapani
Hydropower Project in Nepal in 1996 (Crow and Singh 2000; Sharma 2006). At the
same time officials in the government of Nepal have noted that they lacked ‘experience in
competitive bidding processes for selecting foreign private investors in power projects’
(Upadhyay and Tuladhar 1997, 95) and suggests a need to guard against the practitioners
of predatory capitalism, which is so often overlooked by the most ardent apostles of
liberalization.
Despite the continual growth in demand for electricity, large dams have proven to
be extremely controversial. The criticisms to hydroelectricity project can be grouped
together in an admittedly arbitrary, but heuristic manner. One area of objection disputes
the claims that Himalayan hydroelectricity is environmentally benign or at least is
minimally invasive. Bhatt (1992), Dogra (1992), Gohain (2008), and Valdiya (1993)
argue that building large storage dams in seismically active areas like the Himalayas is
inherently dangerous. Should a large dam like the Tehri be damaged or destroyed in an
earthquake the potential floods could be devastating to millions downstream. Recent
geological research suggests that such concerns are not misplaced since new evidence
points to the existence of an active seismic fault beneath the Tehri dam (Gupta et al 2012;
Mahesh et al 2012; Mukerjee 2015). Kumar (1996) and Johnson (2010) point to the
damage caused by storage dams when they submerge dozens or hundreds of square
kilometres of forests and farmland. Bahuguna (n.d.: 7) declares that ‘the Himalaya is
bleeding today on account of the onslaught of aggressive developments’ and Kishwar
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(1995, 7) agrees, arguing that the Tehri dam in particular will render the Ganges ‘a dead
river.’
Another area of objection centres on the distribution of the benefits of
hydroelectricity projects. Dogra (1998) and Dharmadhikary (2008) question the assertion
that these projects benefit the nation as a whole but argue that they only provide
electricity to the urban elite. Kumar (1996), Bhattacharyya (2007) and Gohain (2008)
claim that the agenda to build hydroelectric dams is driven in part by profit-seeking
private companies with close ties to powerful politicians instead of a political process
devoted to improving the common good. Dharmadhikary (2008, 10) agrees and points to
the ‘large number of private companies, many without any previous experience in the
sector, jumping in to sign MoUs [Memoranda of Understanding] for building hydropower
projects in order to capitalise on the hydro agenda while it lasts.’ Kishwar (1995, 13)
goes further in arguing that a mega project provides ‘an opportunity for large scale
money-making, through corruption and outright loot, by contractors, bureaucrats and
politicians.’ Moreover, Sethi (2014, 19) charges that these problems extend to the entire
energy sector in India:
Poor vision, poor planning and procurement practices, high degree of political
interference in all commercial decisions and human resource management, and,
above all, the lucrative arbitrage offered by a tariff regime that ranges from free
power to power priced at rates not charged anywhere else in the world has led
to a grossly inefficient and distorted sector wherein available data is completely
unreliable and doctored to obfuscate massive corruption, poor productivity and
a culture of mediocrity.
While difficult to verify, these allegations of corruption are persistent and cannot be
ignored.
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A third set of objections relates to the adverse affects of hydroprojects to the
people living near them, with the understanding that with the largest dams ‘near’ is a
comparative term thereby challenging received notions of the ‘local’ (Dirlik 1999;
Escobar 2001; Ferguson and Gupta 2002). With most hydel proposals, the required
environmental impact assessments consider the effects of the project on the area within a
radius of 10 or even 7 km from the dam and reservoir (Gohain 2008; Qiu 2012). As such,
hydel assessments tend to overlook the downstream impacts of dams as well as the
effects of power lines extending over hundreds of kilometres. Bisht (2009), Everard and
Kataria (2010) and Gohain (2008) argue that with past hydroprojects those people
forcibly dispossessed of their homes and farms received inadequate or no rehabilitation
so that the oustees are plunged into poverty. Johnson (2010) further argues that the
methods used in common by the public and private sectors in planning and building large
hydroelectricity dams violate the basic human rights of those living near the project sites.
A fourth area of objections confront the empirical record of hydroelectricity
projects and argue that the promises made by dam advocates have not been kept. Past
dams have cost more than projected, the actual power generated has been lower than
expected, and the lifespan of the dams have been shorter than planned (McCully 2001;
Baghel 2014). One distinctive feature common to numerous projects built during the past
four decades has been an unresolved problem of siltation where the reservoir, diversion
tunnels and turbines fill with silt surprisingly quickly. Dogra (1992) and Dharmadhikary
(2008) note that Himalayan rivers have heavy silt loads and argue that dam designers
consistently fail to adequately account for them while Gohain (2008) argues that the
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construction methods used to build the dams make the silt problem worse by physically
altering the riverbed.

Hydel in Practice
In practice, Bhutan has been relatively successful in building hydroelectric dams
and contributing to cross-border in electricity. The country began its development of
hydel in the 1989 with the commissioning of the Chukha dam. The dam was funded ‘on
the basis that a 60% grant and 40% loan be provided by India for the estimated cost of the
dam’ (Katel, Schmidt-Vogt and Dendup 2015, 279). Bhutan’s largest hydroelectric
project, the Tala dam, was completed in 2006 and the Indian prime minister Manmohan
Singh attended the dedication ceremony in recognition of India’s financial support of the
project. The Tala dam is classified as a run of river project but does have a storage
capacity of 0.36 km2 and was built as a joint venture between public sector companies
from India like WAPCOS Ltd. and public sector companies from Bhutan such as Druk
Green and the Bhutan Power Corporation. The transmission line connecting Tala to the
Indian grid is a PPP that includes the Power Grid Corporation, a public sector Indian
company, and Tata Power Ltd. which is a private sector firm from India (Pillai 2011).
There was little evidence of any objection to the construction of Tala from any
quarter. Several observers have suggested that this may be due to efforts by the
government of Bhutan to cautiously pursue economic liberalization while at the same
time maintain the local difference in Bhutanese society. This mentality of government
was first articulated in the late 1980s by then-King Jigme Singye who called it ‘the
Middle Path of development’ implies a Buddhist path of moderation meant to encourage
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economic growth while minimizing environmental and social disruptions (Uddin, Taplin
and Yu 2007). One method used to measure the effects of liberalization on society is the
Gross National Happiness index meant to complement the Gross National Product index
which measures economic growth. Brooks (2011, 652) suggests that ‘rather than being
eroded by modernization, there may be a synergistic relationship between development
and Buddhism in Bhutan’ but cautions that the question of whether Bhutan’s
development strategy is based on Buddhism or merely couched in religious terms remains
unanswered.
However, criticism of hydel development is slowly beginning to emerge partly
due to engineering and ecological issues as well as political concerns. In 2011 serious
leaks were discovered in the Tala dam which has led to questions about how the dam was
built and to calls for improved quality control in future projects (Wangdi 2011). Quality
control issues have continued with dams like Punatsangchu I which is facing a
construction delay of at least one year after the right bank of the project starting sinking.
With a height of 136 metres it is the largest dam to be built thus far in Bhutan (Sarkar
2013).
Himalayan hydel in India has been very controversial for several decades. The
Tehri dam (actually the first stage of the larger three stage Tehri Hydro Power Complex)
was recently completed after three decades of objections and resistance from multiple
actors. It was built by the Tehri Hydro Development Corporation (THDC) which is a
joint venture between the government of India and the state government of Uttarakhand.
The dam itself has been declared ‘an engineering marvel’ that will provide clean
hydroelectricity as well as provide valuable lessons on the crafting of ‘amicable
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solutions’ in disputes over large dams (Adhikari 2009, 26). The dam has also been
condemned as a ‘catastrophe’ in ecological, social and cultural terms. Kishwar (1995, 5)
rejects government allegations that those who oppose the dam are motivated purely by
NIMBYism but instead insists they have legitimate objections.
The Tehri dam reflects the typical language used within the developmentalist
mentality of government. Following the experience of building the Tehri dam, the state
government of Uttarakhand has developed a policy goal to promote ‘a “harmonious
blend” of public-sector and private participation’ that will lead to the construction of the
second and third stages of the larger power complex by various PPPs over the next few
years (‘Hydro Development’ 2006). Sharma (2008a) claims that the THDC have learned
from its experience in building the Tehri dam and that future projects will conduct the
rehabilitation of those displaced by dams more sensitively and effectively. Sharma
(2008b) also contends that all the impacts of the Tehri dam were successfully mitigated
so that the benefits of the dam greatly outweigh the costs and that those people displaced
by the dam are much better off in their new settlements because the company’s
rehabilitation plan was quite thorough. Bisht (2009) challenges this claim in her
ethnographic study of the people displaced by the dam. By examining the material lives
and perspectives of those who were resettled the town of New Tehri, Bisht’s fieldwork
demonstrates the need to account for local difference rather depend on the generic
assumptions common to Environmental Impact Assessments.
The Loharinag Pala project, located on the Bhagirathi river near the Tehri dam,
was halted in July 2009. The public sector company NTPC had been contracted to build
the large run of river dam on the Bhagirathi river but encountered numerous objections
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after construction began (Mukul 2010). The justification for Loharinag Pala was that the
project would provide electricity needed for economic growth and reduction of poverty.
In addition the dam would tap into India’s unused potential for hydel and reduce the
country’s reliance on fossil fuels. NTPC argued that the social and environmental would
be more than adequately mitigated and that the benefits of the project clearly outweighed
the impacts (NTPC 2007).
Multiple actors such as the Ganga Ahwan and Vishva Hindu Parishad (World
Hindu Council) condemned the project as merely providing electricity for urban elites
while destroying ‘the traditional Indian ethos of worshipping nature and living in
harmony with it’ (Agrawal n.d.) The explicitly Hindutva nature of their resistance to the
dam has prompted questions about whether the anti-dam groups ‘genuinely seek to
promote social and environmental justice through the mobilisation of various religious
teachings and values’ or are simply using environmental issues ‘to promote the chauvinist
agenda of Hindu nationalism’ (Mawdsley 2005, 2). Sharma (2012, 28) suggests that both
motives have informed the eco-nationalist elements of ‘the saffron brigade.’
Hydel development in SAARC’s growth quadrangle is by far the most
complicated in Nepal. In the years following the end of Nepal’s civil war in 2006,
continuing political instability has undercut attempts at expanding Nepal’s hydroelectric
capacity (Sovacool, Dhakal, Gippner and Bambawale 2011). As described above,
various governments of Nepal (GoN) have sought to expand the role of the private sector
in hydroelectricity development in part to raise private and international funding for
projects that will provide electricity for domestic consumption as well as for export to
India. Both the West Seti and Upper Karnali proposals originated as private sector
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projects by the Snowy Mountain Engineering Corporation (SMEC) of Australia for West
Seti and the GMR Group of India for Upper Karnali. Both proposals have been
challenged by different groups for similar reasons. The Water and Energy Users’
Federation – Nepal (WAFED) based in Kathmandu argued that the electricity generated
by the West Seti dam should be consumed in Nepal instead of being exported to India
since 60 per cent of Nepalis do not have access to electricity. Under pressure from
WAFED, Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)6, and other groups, the government of
Nepal revoked SMEC’s license to build the dam in July 2011 (Chataut 2011; ‘Govt
Revokes License’ 2011).
On March 1, 2012 the GoN signed an MOU with the China Three Gorges
Corporation (CTGC) that would give the corporation a 75 per cent stake in the $1.6
billion project. The MOU immediately proved controversial as the opposition parties
Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) charged
that the agreement violated several government policies and procedures and a Public
Interest Litigation lawsuit was filed with the Nepali Supreme Court. At the same time a
local stakeholder organization, the West Seti Stakeholder Committee, was created that
agitated for the dam in a series of strikes and protests. A revised MOU was then agreed
between the GoN and CTGC in August 2012 (‘Chinese Firm Threatens’ 2012; ‘SC
Summons Govt’ 2012; ‘Far-West Wants’ 2012).
The revised MOU, however, failed to resolve the controversy. In August 2013
the Investment Board of Nepal intervened in order to delay the project again by
demanding that changes be made in the project’s rehabilitation and resettlement plan for
project-affected people. A few weeks later, the CTGC agreed to schedule a meeting with
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the GoN to discuss possible changes to the project (‘Talks on West Seti’ 2013; ‘West Seti
Completion’ 2013).
The Upper Karnali dam has also drawn objection from Nepal’s Maoists who
argue that since nearly 60 per cent of Nepalis lack access to electricity the dam should
produce power for domestic consumption rather than be exported to India. The Maoists
also demand that the level of private sector involvement in the project be reduced and
that of the Nepali public sector be increased in order to preserve the ‘sovereign right of
Nepalis to their natural resources’ (Sarkar 2011). On 22 May 2011 a group of people
attacked the construction site and burned down three office buildings although the
Maoists denied that they were involved. While the Maoists of Nepal have opted to
participate in Nepali electoral politics, their approach draws more on the revolutionary
mentality of government of Mao Zedong than the developmentalism of the World Bank
(Dutton 2008). This is not the first time that the Maoists have intervened forcefully to
stop private sector projects that would facilitate electricity exports to India. In 2002, the
then ‘rebel’ Maoists attacked the Jhimruk dam which was a joint venture between
Intercraft of Norway and Nepal’s Butwal Power Company initiated in 1994 (‘Norway
Support’ 2003) and also attacked an electricity transmission line connecting three major
hydel dams in late 2002 interrupting negotiations between India and Nepal over
electricity exports (‘Nepal’s Hydropower Crisis’ 2003).
In July 2013, work on the Upper Karnali dam was further delayed when projectaffected people filed a petition with the Nepali Supreme Court asking that the MOU
between the government and the Indian company GMR Group be declared invalid
because it violated the rights of the local population. The following month the court
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dismissed the petition and ruled that the project can go forward (‘Decks Clear’ 2013). In
2014, Mohan Baidhya reiterated Maoist opposition to Indian investment in Nepal’s
hydropower sector including Upper Karnali and Upper Marsyangadi to be built by GMR
India, Koshi7 High Dam to be built by the GOI, and Arun III to be built by Sutlej Jal
Vidyat Nigam Ltd. (‘Nepal Maoist Party’ 2014).
Hydel in Nepal has since encountered further delays. The massive earthquake
(8.1 on the Richter scale) of April 15, 2015 caused severe damage throughout the country
and all hydel construction was brought to a halt. In September, a new Nepalese
constitution was approved leading to widespread protests including a virtual blockade
along the India-Nepal border. The blockade disrupted work on hydel projects and some
foreign investment was withdrawn. (Haviland 2015; Dahal 2016; Shrestha 2016)

Another barrier is the legacy of decades of failed hydro-diplomacy especially
between India and Nepal. There is a lingering distrust between countries in the region
regarding their motives in promoting cross-border trade and concerns over potential
exploitation persist. Attempting to be nonpartisan, Rasul (2014, 29) argues that
transboundry issues in the region are ‘generally seen from a national perspective’ and as
the result ‘this narrow perspective often leads to bilateralism and encourages unilateral
and fragmented decisions’. Diplomatic difficulties regarding trade in general,
distribution of water from Himalayan rivers and hydroelectricity between India and
Nepal dates to the 1950s while disagreements between Bhutan and India over these issues
are more recent (Pant 1954; Iyer 2008).
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Hydro-diplomacy between Indian and Nepal began with the Kosi river agreement
in 1954 which was amended in 1966 due to Nepali concerns that it was unfair to Nepal.
The Mahakali treaty was signed in 1996, but has never been implemented (Crow and
Singh 2000; Iyer 2008).
Subedi (1999, 954) suggests that Nepal, for example, is less motivated by a desire
for self-sufficiency but sees India as eager to ‘exploit Nepal’s hydropower potential to its
advantage and that this perception is based on earlier agreements which allowed India to
benefit disproportionately than Nepal.’ Nepali Maoist faction leader Baidhya agrees
stating that various proposed projects ‘are more in favour of India than Nepal. We
[Maoists] will obstruct their implementation until the unequal agreement is scrapped and
a fresh one is signed’ (‘Nepal Maoist Party’ 2014).
Upredi (1993) and Dhungel (2008) challenge the claim that India is attempting to
exploit its smaller neighbors. Upredi acknowledges that while some Nepali criticism of
past agreements is valid, most of it is due to the domestic politics of vested interests and
partisanship, and that India has never intended to bully Nepal. Dhungel dismisses Nepali
concerns as needless anxiety that should be set aside given the importance of Nepal’s
economic self-interest in producing more electricity for domestic consumption as well as
sale to India.
In Bhutan, there has been growing concern over the power disparity between
Bhutan and India. Critics question the practice of giving Indian companies fifty-one per
cent equity in the joint ventures being created to build the newer and larger dams like
Bunakha and Sunkosh. In 2011, the Bhutanese parliament complained to the government
that giving an outside company a majority stake in a project is not compliant with the
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country’s hydel development law and policy (Dikshit 2011 and Lamsang 2011). The data
suggests that the construction of dams and cross-border trade in hydroelectricity has not
benefitted Bhutan as much as expected. Bhutan’s export of hydroelectricity has grown
by 18 per cent from 2004 to 2014 and the economy has grown over the same period by
7.72 per cent the country’s current account deficit has also grown (Khan and Robson
2015, 74). Moreover, Bhutan’s national debt has grown by 17.1 per cent since 2008 due
to increased imports but also the construction of new dams. These dams are increasingly
being funded through loans and Bhutan’s external debt is growing despite strong
economic growth (Chophel 2015; Khan and Robson 2015).

Conclusion
1

SAARC was established in 1985 and its current members are Afghanistan, Bangladesh,

Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The following have observer
status: Australia, China, European Union, Iran, Japan, Mauritius, Myanmar, South Korea,
and the United States.

2

The numbers for the percentage of the population with access to electricity can be

somewhat misleading. For example, roughly 1/3 of the population in Nepal may have
access to electricity but actual consumption of electricity is quite low. With loadshedding (power cuts) of up to 16 hours a day only a small part of Nepal’s energy needs
are met with electricity. Some 87 per cent of the country’s energy needs are met with
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biomass (Singh 2013). After the earthquake of April 2015 the use of electricity has most
likely declined sharply in parts of the country.
3

It should be noted, though, that Bhutan itself has benefitted greatly from its increasing
electricity exports to India. In 2010, the government of Bhutan derived about 40 per cent
of its revenues from electricity exports (Dhakal and Jenkins 2013; Singh 2013).
4

NIMBY stands for Not in My Back Yard and implies a narrow-minded parochialism
that fails to appreciate the common good.
Details of the financial arrangements for HPL and Khimti 1 can be found at SN Power’s
website (http://www.snpower.com/about-us/owners) and the Norfund website
(http://www.norfund.no).
5

From this point on I will refer to the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) as ‘the
Maoists’ for the sake of brevity.
6

7

The Kosi or Koshi river is a tributary of the Ganges river and flows from Nepal to the
Indian state of Bihar.
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